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STRIPPED OF MEANING: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE GOVERNMENT AS EDUCATOR
I. INTRODUCTION

A casual consumer of the most widely-read newspapers in
the United States might be surprised to learn that public
school administrators and officials can constitutionally conduct
"strip searches" of public school students. Surprised, that is,
because in the Summer of 2009 the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Safford Unified School District u.
Redding, 1 ostensibly an "unalloyed victor[y]" for Savana
Redding. 2 As a thirteen year-old Arizona middle school honors
student, Redding had been forced by school administrators to
partially expose her breasts and pubic area in a fruitless search
for ibuprofen pills that was instigated after another student
accused her of distributing and possessing the pills on campus
in violation of district policy. 3 Sensationalized for months as
the "strip search case," most news accounts predictably led by
focusing on the Court's ruling 8-1 that school administrators
had violated Redding's Fourth Amendment rights. 4
The "common sense prevails" meme surrounding Safford's
"unexpected" Fourth Amendment ruling, 5 however, obscured

I. 129 S. Ct. 263::3 (2009).
2. Editorial, The Supreme Court in Summation, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2009, at

A31.
3. 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
1. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Child's Rights Violated by Strip
Search, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at A16; Robert Barnes, Student Strip Search
Illegal, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, at AI; Editorial, Our View on School Discipline:
Strip-search Case 8nds in Victory for Common Sense, USA TODAY, June 26, 2009, at
12A; Editorial, An Unreasonable Search, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at A21.
5. Bob Egelko, Girl's Strip Search Ruled Unconstitutional, S.F. CH!WN., June 26,
2009, at AS. The sophomoric "towel-snapping" attitude of some Justices at oral
argument suggested that the Court would rule in favor of Safford Unified. See, e.g.,
Dahlia
Lithwick,
Ginsburg
Rides
Again,
SLATE
(June
25,
2009),
http://www.slate.com/id/2220927/entry/2221415; see also Dahlia Lithwick, Search Me:
The Supreme Court is Neither Hot nor Bothered by Strip Searches, SLATE (Apr. 21,
2009), http://www.slate.com/id/2216608 (noting sarcastically that the entry for Safford
in the "Supreme Court Concordance of Not Getting It" will read '"Court compares strip
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two equally important holdings. First, on closer examination,
the majority opinion "appeared to leave the door open to
searches in some circumstances," 6 by creating an amorphous
standard that focused on school administrators' subjective
beliefs about the "danger," "power," "quantity," or location of
suspected contraband. 7 Thus, at the same time that the Court
appeared to "bolster[] students' privacy rights" by striking
down one strip search, 8 it carved out an ill-defined safe-harbor
exception for others. 9
Second, the Court held 7-2 that the school administrators
who searched Redding were entitled to qualified immunity and
could not be held personally liable for their actions. 10 Although
the Court preserved Redding's claims against Safford Unified
and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine the
district's liability, 11 the majority pronounced the existing
student strip search caselaw as so muddled that Safford
Unified administrators were excused for mistakenly believing
that strip searching Savana Redding was justified under the
circumstances. This, almost twenty-five years after Justice
Stevens observed in T.L.O., the first school search case to reach
the Supreme Court, that if "[o]ne thing is clear under any
[school search] standard[,]" it is that strip searches "have no
place in the school house." 12 In the end, the Safford Court

searches of 13-year-old girls to American Pie-style locker-room hijinks"') .•Justice Ruth
Dader Ginsburg, then the only woman serving on the Court, was apparently concerned
enough to give a rare interview in which she publicly criticized her fellow ,Justices and
called for the inclusion of more women on the Court. See .Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg:
Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May 5, 2009, at A1 ('"They have never been
a 13-year-old girl. . . . It's a very sensitive age for a girl. l didn't think that my
colleagues, some of them, quite understood."'). Some scholars suspect that Ginsburg
persuaded her colleagues on the Fourth Amendment issue. See Did a Wise Woman
Change the Outcome of Safford v. Redding?, THE FACULTY LOUNGE, (,July 1:l, 2009),
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2009/07/did-a-wise-woman-justice-change-theoutcome-of-safford-v-redding.html (last visited January 17, 2010); sec generally,
Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford, 129 S. Ct. 263:l (No. 08-179).
6. Egelko, supra note 5.
7. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2612-1a.
8. Egclko, supra note 5.
9. See, e.g., Francisco M. Negron, Opposing View: Ruling Missed Opportunity,
USA TODAY, June 26, 2009, at A12 (criticizing the Court for "miss[ingj an opportunity
to provide clearer guidance to school officials").
10. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 264:1-44.
11. ld. at 2614.
12. New Jersey v. 'l'.L.O., 169 U.S. :125, 382 n.25 (1985) (Stevens, .J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Doe v. Renfrow, 6a1 F.2d 91, 92-9:l (7th Cir. 1980)
("It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 1:-l-
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paradoxically appeared to ratify common sense on the one hand
and reject it on the other. 13
But such has been the story of the Supreme Court's public
school caselaw, a story that in large part traces the rise of mass
public schooling. It is no coincidence that one of the earliest
public education-related cases to reach the Court-decided in
the same year that Horace Mann died-allowed states financial
flexibility in expanding the availability of public common
schools. 14 As the bureaucratization and growth of public
schooling increased, 15 so did the Court's number of cases
arising out of the school context. Prior to the 1950s, the Court
rarely heard education-related cases; 16 today, not a term goes
by without the Court deciding several cases that impact
schools. And, as American society and its expectations of
schooling have evolved, the Court has played a key role in
shaping the public school environment. Occasionally, the Court
has staked out bold positions defying then-prevailing "common
sense" and society eventually followed, as in the school
desegregation cases and in student conscience. 17 At other
times, the Court has blessed long-standing institutional
practices, such as peer-grading, 18 or emerging trends in
education reform, like vouchers. 19

year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude."')).
l:l. The Justices were explicitly of two minds concerning qualified immunity.
Although Justice Stevens felt that Safford was "a case where clearly established law
[met] clearly outrageous conduct," Justice Souter, writing for the majority, observed
that "[tjhe unconstitutionality of outrageous conduct obviously will be unconstitutional,
this being the reason ... that '[tjhe easiest cases don't even arise."' Compare Safford,
129 S. Ct. at 2641 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), with 129 S.
Ct. at 2613.
14. Springfield v. Quick, 63 U.S. 56 (1859) (preserving the ability of states to
allocate among towns, on the basis of need, funds raised for public schools established
on Congressionally-set-aside lands).
15. See DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BES'l' SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URllAN
EDUCATION (1974); see also DIANE RAVITCH, LEF'l' BACK: A CENTURY OF BATTLES OVEH
SCHOOL REFORM (2000).
16. See l'E[(RY A. ZIRKEL, A DIGEST OF SUPREME COURT CASES AFFECTING
l~DUCATION (5th ed. 2009).
17. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 18:3 (1954) (striking down "separate
hut equal" schooling); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(rejecting a requirement that students pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag or face
discipline).
18. Owasso lndep. Sch. Dist. No. l-Oll v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002) (upholding
student correction of other students' work and oral reporting of grades).
19. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding Ohio's voucherbased Pilot Scholarship Program against an Establishment Clause challenge).
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Yet, the Court's impact on public education extends well
beyond its holdings and their direct and most visible effects.
For when the Court hears education-related matters it does
more than decide "cases and controversies," 20 it continues the
process of defining "the role of government as educator, as
compared with the role of government as sovereign." 21 And,
just as a teacher constructs his "teaching persona," 22 the Court
bases its conception of the Government as Educator on its ideas
about students, schools, and pedagogy. This continuallyevolving conception of the Government as Educator guides the
Court in its decisionmaking, which in turn contributes to
society's expectations for and understanding of public schools.
Accordingly, the Court's beliefs about schooling have profound
implications-beyond those most evident from legal doctrinefor the evolution of public schools.
This Article analyzes the Court's K-12 student speech and
school search lines of caselaw in an attempt to flesh out the
Court's evolving conception of the Government as Educator and
evaluate what effects it has on public schools. In doing so, the
Article metaphorically analogizes different conceptions of the
Government as Educator to the two primary pedagogical
approaches to student instruction, student- and teachercentered. The Article then argues that the Court's robust
embrace of schools' values-inculcation function has led it to
develop an expansive conception of the Government as
Educator's role, one based heavily on educators' values, that
promotes the "educationalizing of social problems," 23 appends a
new component to the "Real Schools" paradigm, 24 and ensures

20. U.S. CONST. art. Ill,§ 2.
21. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist No. 26 v. l'ico, 157 U.S. 853,
909-10 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In a contentious 5-1 decision, Pica limited
school officials' authority to remove books from public school libraries for reasons not
directly related to "'educational suitability."' Id. at 871.
22. David F. Labaree, Limits on the Impact of f;~ducation Reform: The Case of
Progressivism and U.S. Schools, 1900-1950, 18 (2007) (unpublished paper presented at
"The Century of the School: Continuity and Innovation During the First Half of the
20th Century" Confercncte, Monte Verita, Ascona, Switzerland, September, 2007) (on
file with author); see also LARRY CUBAN, HOW TEACHERS TAUGHT 255-56 (2d ed. 199:1)
("What teachers know about the subjects they teach and how they use that knowledge
with students, the beliefs they have about how children learn and develop, and the
social attitudes they bring to their classroom shape how they teach.").
23. David F. Labaree, The Winning Ways of a Losing Strategy: l~ducationalizing
Social Problems in the United States, 58 EDUC. THEORY 447 (2008).
24. Mary Haywood Metz, Real School: A Universal Drama Amid /Jisparate
Experience, in EDUCATION POLITICS FOR THE N~;w CEN'l'Ul\Y 75-91 (Douglas K Mitchell
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that students' political socialization in schools varies depending
on location.
The end result suggests that the school administrators who
strip-searched Savana Redding did so less out of a flawed
understanding of legal doctrine than a failure to question an
institutional culture-fostered in part by the Court's
explication of the Government as Educator-that increasingly
promotes the idea that "Real Schools" combat social problems.
II. THE GOVERNMENT AS EDUCATOR
Out of all the Supreme Court's school-related cases, the
phrase "government as educator" has appeared in only one. In
then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Board of Education v. Pica,
he observed that "[w]hen it acts as an educator, at least at the
[K-12] level, the government is engaged in inculcating social
values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young
people." 25 Although the phrase might have been new to the
Supreme Court Reporter, the concept was not; the Government
as Educator's philosophical roots can be traced to the
education-for-civic-virtue and values-transmission arguments
made for and against the early common schools. 26
From the perspective of today's citizens, who have
overwhelmingly experienced education as a state enterprise,
governmental authority over education during the earliest
years of the Republic might appear surprisingly weak. This
resulted in part from early debates on the propriety of
government control over education between Jeffersonian
"democratic localists," who rejected state-run education as an
illegitimate attempt to "impose social change" from the top
down, and "paternalistic voluntarists" and "bureaucrats," who

& Margaret E. Goertz eds., 1990).
25. Pico, 457 U.S. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's
explanation of the Government as Educator's role will he used throughout the Article.
26. See Horace Mann, Twelfth Annual Report (1848), in THE REPUBLIC AND THE
SCHOOL: HORACE MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 79, 89-97 (Lawrence A.
Cremin ed., 1957) ("However elevated the moral character of a constituency may be;
however well informed in matters of general science or history, yet, they must, if
citi7:ens of a Republic, understand something of the true nature and functions of the
government under which they live."); see also Pica, 457 U.S. at 914 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that public schools "fulfill the vital role of . . . 'inculcating
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system"'
(citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979))).
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"saw [government] precisely as the educator of the people." 27
The state-run approach not only "triumphed" as a matter of
organizational form, 28 but also as a legitimate method of values
transmission. So much so that over a century later Justice
Rehnquist, elaborating on the role of Government as Educator,
opined that "[t]he idea that [public school] students have a
right of access, in the school, to information other than that
thought by their educators to be necessary is contrary to the
very nature of an inculcative education." 29
Yet, recognizing that the Government as Educator instills
values only raises the question of which values it may
legitimately promote. For a time, this potentiallandmine went
relatively undisturbed, buried by a general social consensus on
what
constituted
"good
citizenship." 30
Indeed,
the
characteristics of good citizenship were apparently so obvious
to the early-20th century Pierce v. Society of Sisters the Court
recognized, without elaboration, certain core areas of state
authority in education, including the right to require "that
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly
inimical to the public welfare." 31 When that consensus began to
unravel, however, schools and legislatures were increasingly
confronted with the thorny task of fleshing out the Government
as Educator's values-inculcating curriculum. And, it was only a
matter of time until those dissatisfied with that curriculum
took their cases to court.

27. MICHAEL KATZ, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN l~DUCATION 21-57 (1987).
28. ld. at 2.
29. Pica, 157 U.S. at 911 (Rehnquist, .J., dissenting).
30. This is not to say that all segments of society accepted the consensus. See, e.g.,
HOWAIW ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2005).
31. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 581 (1925). Government as Educator
values-transmission was a core issue in Pierce, in which the Court struck down an
Oregon initiative that effectively abolished private schools. Although one would not
learn of it from reading the Court's opinion, the law had been passed during a time of
rising anti-Catholic and nativist sentiment and was promoted hy a then-influential Ku
Klux Klan. See, e.g., PAULA AHRAMS, CROSS PURPOSES: PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS
AND THE STRUGGLE OVER COMPULSORY PUHLIC EDUCATION 7-H (2009). In some sense
then, Pierce represents an early example of the Court correcting Government-asEducator malfeasance.
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A. Pedagogical Theories
The Supreme Court's approach towards deciding cases in
the student speech and school search context, especially since
the late-1970s, 32 has generally been one of deference to the
decisions of state and local policymakers, 33 who most often are
the human incarnation of the Government as Educator. For
roughly a thirty-year period stretching from the middle of the
Second World War until the mid-1970s, however, that
deference was tempered by a more robust conception of student
autonomy and the role students assumed as (compelled)
participants in the schooling process. Perhaps taking a cue
from its contemporaneously evolving school desegregation
jurisprudence, the Court during this period was relatively less
reluctant to police the Government as Educator's relationship
with, and authority over, its students. This is not to say that
public schools during this period exemplified progressive
educational pedagogy or tolerated expansive student
autonomy~with few exceptions they were not~but rather to
note the Court's more solicitous treatment of students'
interests during the burgeoning civil rights movement in cases
concerning a variety of issues. In each of these two periods~
one more solicitous to students' "rights" than the other~the
Court's conception of the Government as Educator can be
compared to one of the two dominant pedagogical
"traditions . . . [that] have shaped classroom instruction:
teacher-centered and student-centered." 34
During the earlier period, the Court emphasized a more
student-centered pedagogical role for the Government as
Educator. A student-centered, or "progressive," pedagogical
approach views students as semi-independent individuals who
"exercise a substantial degree of responsibility for what is

82. See, e.f?., Richard Arum & Doreet Preiss, Law & Disorder, EDUC. NEXT 59, 60
(Fall 2009) (observing the Court's "post-1975 pattern of sympathy with schools").
aa. The Court's school desq,>Tegation caselaw obviously overruled the decisions of
some policymakers and has been the subject of much scholarship. See, e.g., J. HARVIE
WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
DES~;GREGATION (1979). From the perspective advocated in this Article, the Court was
guided by a "student-centered" conception of the Government as Educator in its
desegregation jurisprudence. That discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
::H. Larry Cuban, Hugging the Middle: Teaching in an Era of Testing and
Accountability, 1980-2005, 15 EDUC. PoL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, :i (2007); see
generally CUBAN, supra note 22.
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taught and how it is learned." 35 Student-centered classrooms
often utilize group projects and learning activities so that
students may acquire knowledge experientially. Educators in
student-centered classrooms perform a carefully calibrated
balancing act: they must simultaneously maintain control over
and incorporate students in various "decisions [that] touch the
core of the teacher's authority." 36 Accordingly, for the purposes
of this Article, the student-centered Government as Educator
takes a "learn by doing" approach to education for citizenship
in which students are given greater latitude to practice
citizenship in schools.
Since the mid-1970s, however, the Court has emphasized a
more teacher-centered role for the Government as Educator.
Students enjoy limited autonomy in teacher-centered
classrooms; teachers "controlD what is taught, when, and under
what conditions" and "transmit knowledge, skills, and values to
students.'m Teacher-centered classrooms tend to feature
stereotypical accoutrements such as lectures, textbooks, and
desks arranged in rows facing the source of instruction.
Students take notes and earn grades based on achievement on
series of assignments and evaluative exams. Students have
little to no influence over core decisions. If this sounds familiar,
it is because teacher-centered pedagogy historically has been
the dominant mode of instruction in public schools and remains
the approach encountered by most students on a day-to-day
basis. 38 Thus, under the teacher-centered Government as
Educator, students are told how to be good citizens and
expected to conform.
The teacher-centered and student-centered roles outlined
above stand at opposite ends of a continuum, but in reality
educators increasingly use various iterations of hybridized
"teacher-centered progressivism" that fall at points between
the two extremes. 39 In some cases, teachers' blending of the two
styles stems from genuinely held pedagogical beliefs. At other

Cuban, supra note 31, at :i.
CUBAN, supra note 22, at 271.
Cuban, supra note 34, at 3.
See, e.g., CUBAN, supra note 22; see also David K. Cohen, Teaching Practice:
Plus ()a Change ... , in CONTRIBU'l'!NG TO EDUCATIONAL CHANm; 27-tl1 (Phillip W.
Jackson ed., 1988) (examining the failure of student·centered pedagogy to displace
teacher-centered instruction).
39. See Cuban, supra note :H, at 20-22.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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times, however, the "blending" represents little more than a
formalist attempt to imbue a "student-centered patina"40 to a
teacher-centered classroom out of a sense of duty to implement
perceived "best practices."41
An examination of the Government as Educator's
development in key student speech and school search cases in
light of the two pedagogical "strands" uncovers similar
formalism at work in the Court's current conception of the
Government as Educator. Although the Court pays rhetorical
homage to the student-centered opinions of yesterday, 42 it has
nevertheless adopted a strongly teacher-centered conception of
Government as Educator based upon, and highly deferential to,
the ever-expanding goals and values of school administrators.
As this Article argues below, if the Constitution has been "for
all practical purposes turned over to the Supreme Court,"43 the
Court has delegated responsibility for distinguishing the
government's separate roles as educator and sovereign in the
student speech and school search contexts to the authorities
often most eager to merge them.

B. The Student-Centered Strand
The idea that students should enjoy a sense of autonomy in
pedagogical decisionmaking is an historical anomaly. 44 So, too,
are conceptions regarding an expanded scope of permissible
student expressiOn. As Justice Thomas argued in his
concurrence in Morse, student "free-speech" rights were
unknown for much of public schools' early history. 45 Rather,

10. hi. at 22.
41. /d. at 21-22.
12. Tink:er's statement that students "do not shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," for example, frequently
appears in education-related cases. See, e.g., Ed. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :-393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
43. Larry D. Kramer, "The Interest of the Man':· James Madison, Popular
Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697,
697 (2006).
41. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 39 (noting that student-centered "conceptions of
instruction are a radical departure from inherited ideas and practices" in which
teachers "are tellers of truth who inculcate knowledge in [passive] students").
15. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-12 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("If
students in public schools were originally understood as having free-speech rights, one
would have expected 19th-century public schools to have respected those rights and
courts to have enforced them. They did not.").
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"teachers taught, and students listened. Teachers commanded,
and students obeyed. Teachers did not rely solely on the power
of ideas to persuade; they relied on discipline to maintain
order." 46
The rise of "pedagogical progressivism" in the twentieth
century, however, challenged this thinking and posited that
experiential learning was critical to student development. 47
Although student-centered instruction made little headway in
America's classrooms, 48 its lexicon flourished as a rhetorical
addition to the "grammar of schooling." 49 By 1918, for example,
the "Cardinal Principles Report" argued that students were
most productive and motivated to learn when schools took into
account students' "dominant interests" and allowed students to
explore those interests with limited guidance. 50 This included
providing students "the means for developing attitudes and
habits important in a democracy," of which "the democratic
organization and administration of the school itself as well as
the cooperative relations of pupil and teacher" were
"indispensable." 51 Whether schools actually allowed students to
take an experiential approach to civic education was a different
story; after all, despite such rhetoric schools were still by and
large "not places for freewheeling debates or exploration of
competing ideas." 52 The Court, however, would incorporate this
student-centered view of civic education in a groundbreaking
decision that questioned popular treatment of perhaps the
nation's most visible patriotic symbol.

46. Id. at 112.
47. See, e.g, John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum. in THE SCHOOL AND
SOCIETY AND THE CHILD AND THB CURRICULUM 181-209 (Philip W. Jackson ed., 1991)
("Abandon the notion of subject-matter as something fixed and ready-made in itself,
outside the child's experience; cease thinking of the child's experience as also
something hard and fast; see it is as something fluent, embryonic, vital .... ").
48. See, e.g., CUBAN, supra note 22.
19. DAVID TYACK & LARRY CUBA!'J, TINKEIUNG TOWARDS UTOPIA (1995) (this is the
"rhetoric of reform").
50. Comm. on the Reorg. of Secondary Educ., Cardinal Principles of Secondary
Education, reprinted in DEP'T OF THE lNTEf!IOI!, BUREAU OF EDUC., BULL. 1918, No. :35.
15-16 (1918) (arguing that education- and vocation-related "decisions should not be
imposed upon [students] by others") (electronic transcription on file with author).
51. Jd. at 8.
52. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. :39:3, 411 (2007) (Thomas, .J., concurring).
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1. Gobitis and Barnette
It seems incongruous with the strongly patriotic aura
surrounding the "Greatest Generation" in the nation's
collective memory 53 that during the midst of the Second World
War the Court struck down a state-imposed requirement that
students recite the Pledge of Allegiance. 54 Board of Education
v. Barnette, one of the first cases to expand students' expressive
rights in schools, directly repudiated the Court's decision in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, which had just three
years earlier upheld a similar regulation over the religiousbased objections of Jehovah's Witness students and their
families. 55 The contrasting language used by the Court in
Gobitis and Barnette highlights the difference between the
Court's teacher-centered and student-centered conceptions of
the Government as Educator.
The tropes used to justify the Court's modern-day
deferential treatment of state and local policy judgments can be
traced in part to the rhetoric used in Gobitis, where the Court
famously refused to play "school board for the country" and
disclaimed any desire become an "arena for debating issues of
educational policy." 56 The Gobitis Court viewed the
Government as Educator's role in explicitly teacher-centered
terms: school authorities created and disseminated a values
curriculum and students listened. Those with different values
were expected to leave them at home. Although the Court
hinted that it believed the school district's policy was an
ineffective means of promoting patriotic values, 57 it refused on
institutional competency grounds to engage in a debate with
state and local authorities over the "wisdom" of using the
compulsive mechanisms inherent in schools as means to
inculcate values. 58 The Court also declined to police the

5:3. See TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION (1998).

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, a 19 U.S. 621 (194a).
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, :no U.S. 586 (1940).
!d. at 598.
!d. ("For ourselves, we might be tempted to say that the deepest patriotism is
best engendered by giving unfettered scope to the most crochety beliefs. Perhaps it is
best ... to give to the least popular sect leave from conformities like those here in
issue."').
58. !d. at 597-98 (reasoning that to strike down the mandatory-pledge
requirement "would amount to no less than the pronouncement of pedagogical and
psychological dogma in a field where courts possess no marked and certainly no
controlling competence").
51.
55.
56.
57.
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substance of that values instruction; the Government as
Educator's decision "that a particular program or exercise will
best promote in the minds of children who attend the common
schools an attachment to the institutions of their country"
served as sufficient evidence of curricular soundness. 59 Such
decisions were not open to challenge by students and their
parents except through persuasion and "the remedial channels
of the democratic process." 60 Indeed, the Court went so far as to
suggest that educational policymakers had "the right to
awaken in the child's mind considerations ... contrary to those
implanted by the parent." 61 Provided that school authorities
validly enacted a policy, the Court could not grant "exceptional
immunity" to those on the losing side of the debate without
undermining both the legitimacy of the decisionmaking process
and the efficacy of the resulting values curriculum. 62 In
pedagogical terms, that would have meant forcing the
Government as Educator to cede control of core decisions
related to teacher authority. And that the Court was unwilling
to do.
But only for a short time. Only three years later, the Court
made an about-face and struck down a West Virginia school
district's "flag salute" policy that "contain[ed] recitals taken
largely from the Court's Gobitis opinion." 63 The Barnette
majority largely dispensed with the Gobitis Court's concern for
preserving the Government as Educator's teacher-centered
authority to prescribe values-based instruction, replacing it
instead with a then-novel and rhetorically-sweeping studentcentered vision of the Government as Educator. Where Gobitis
saw students as classical receptors of teacher-transmitted
knowledge, Barnette portrayed students as "conscientious
objectors" with "free minds" 64 possessing "the right of selfdetermination in matters that touch individual opinion and
personal attitude." 65
59. Jd. at 598-99.
60. Id. at 599.
61. ld.; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211, 215 (1972) (Douglas, .J.,
dissenting) ("It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to
give full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of
students to be masters of their own destiny.").
62. Gobitis, :310 U.S. at 600.
63. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :319 U.S. 624 (194:3).
61. ld. at 611 (Black & Douglas, .J.J., concurring).
65. ld. at 631 (majority opinion).
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Contra Gobitis, the Barnette Court had no compunctions
about institutional competency and refused to assume the
inherent
legitimacy
of
school-imposed
civic-values
66
curriculum. In fact, the Barnette majority turned this central
tenet of Gobitis on its head and suggested that small
governmental bodies require greater oversight because, by the
very nature of representing local constituencies, they
necessarily reflect local prejudices that "may feel less sense of
responsibility to the Constitution." 67 The Court argued that
such monitoring was especially necessary in the case of state
and local school authorities, who had historically been tasked
with regulating the selection and transmission of civic values. 68
It was, after all, a strange form of education for citizenship that
taught "that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right
to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to
compel him to utter what is not in his mind."69
Barnette made clear that the Government as Educator
could continue to inculcate values and promote civic education,
but not through policies that compelled students to hold certain
prescribed beliefs or participate in activities and ceremonies in
violation of their First Amendment rights. 70 Barnette, however,
provided little guidance regarding the extent of those rights. It
did not suggest, for example, when and to what degree school
authorities could engage m behavior that might be
characterized as coercive, an issue the Court continues to

66. !d. at 6:-!9 (repudiating the idea that the Court's "duty to apply the Bill of
Rights to assertions of official authority depend[sj upon our possession of marked
competence in the field where the invasion of rights occurs."); id. at 635-36 ("The
question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony so
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual
by official authority under powers committed to any political organization under our
Constitution. We examine rather than assume existence of this power .... ").
67. Id. at 637 (comparing the "relatively trivial" local compulsory policies at issue
in Barnette with Congressionally-created voluntary policies and observing that "[t]here
are village tyrants as well as village Hampdens").
68. /d. ("That [school boards] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes.").
69. /d. at 631.
70. Id. at 612 (holding that "the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control").
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debate. 71 And, despite the decision's student-centered rhetoric,
it failed to outline what limits schools could place on students
when they elected to affirmatively express their now-protected
consciences.
Yet, the opinion contained the ingredients for a studentcentered speech standard. In describing the Barnette plaintiffs
and their actions, the Court found it significant that the
students' "peaceab[le] and orderly" behavior did "not interfere
with or deny rights of others" to participate in the pledge. 72 A
quarter-century after Barnette, the Warren Court would craft a
student speech standard out of these characteristics that
ostensibly was so radical that Justice Black accused the Court
of "surrender[ing] control of the American public school system
to public school students.' 03

2. Tinker
Given the resurgence of the teacher-centered Government
as Educator over the past three decades, 74 it might be an
overstatement to say that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
did for the ideal of expressive freedom in America's public
schools what Brown u. Board of Education did for the idea of
racial equality." 75 As a matter of rhetoric, however, this
characterization does not miss the mark by far: every school
principal who has had to endure a hostile parent meeting can
thank Justice Fortas and his majority opinion for the oftrepeated claim that "state-operated schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism." 76

71. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 639, 612 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court, in upholding an Establishment Clause challenge against a
district's selecting clergy to deliver nonsectarian prayers at a public school graduation,
made no distinction between subtle "psychological coercion" and the "legal sanctions" in
Barnette); see also Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 5cl0 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that
a district's reservation of time for student speech, which could include invocations, over
a public address system before football games constituted impermissible coercion in
violation of the Establishment Clause).
72. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 6:30.
73. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :193 U.S. 503, 525 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
74. Discussed infra Part II.C.
75. Jamie B. Raskin, No Enclaves of Totalitarianism: The Triumph and
Unrealized Promise of the Tinker Decision, 58 AM. U. L. R~w. 1193, 119:l (2009).
76. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
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For the bombastic rhetoric of the opinion, the facts giving
rise to Tinker appear surprisingly quaint when looking back
from the perspective of the twenty-first century. In December
1965, in an act of political awareness that teachers today might
find refreshing, 77 a group of teenagers and children ranging in
age from eight to sixteen joined their parents in an act of
protest against the then-nascent Vietnam War by wearing
small black armbands emblazoned with the now-ubiquitous
peace symbol. Before the students had a chance to wear the
armbands to school, Des Moines school authorities "adopted a
policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be
asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended
until he returned without the armband." 78 Although school
officials would later try to justify the policy by claiming that
they were trying to prevent disruption, the record indicated
that "school authorities simply felt that 'the schools [were] no
place for demonstrations."' 79 When the students attempted to
wear the armbands to school, however, they were suspended
for what amounted to the time of instruction remaining before
the Winter Holidays. A lawsuit ensued. After two lower court
victories for the school district, the case finally reached the
Supreme Court in late-1968 during a much different political
and social climate.
The Court sided with the students, analogizing their
armbands to "pure speech" protected by the First
Amendment, 80 and famously arguing that students do not
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." 81 The Court's language
evinced a much stronger student-centered conception of the
Government as Educator than Barnette. In Tinker, students
not only had a right to be free from the coercive imposition of
government-sanctioned beliefs, 82 they "could not be confined to
the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved"

77. Or mere parroting of their parents' political beliefs. See :19:1 U.S. at 516
(Black, J .. dissenting).
78. /d. at 501 (majority opinion).
79. !d. at 509 n.:>. (quoting school officials as saying that "if the students 'didn't
like the way our elected officials were handling things, it should be handled with the
ballot box and not in the halls of our public schools"').
80. ld. at 506.
81. !d. at 507-08.
82. ld. at 511 ("In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.").
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and were "entitled to freedom of expression of their views."~ 3
And, lest school officials missed the scope of the Court's
decision, it cited with approval language from a highereducation case that described classrooms as "marketplace[s] of
ideas" where students, as potential "leaders," were "trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than
through any kind of authoritative selection."' 84 Indeed, "this
sort of hazardous freedom," the Court opined, formed the "basis
of our national strength." 85 It was this rhetoric that prompted
Justice Stewart to write a separate one-paragraph concurrence
just to clarify that he did not believe in the Court's apparently
"uncritical assumption" that "the First Amendment rights of
children are co-extensive with those of adults." 86
Yet, the Tinker Court's rhetorical excesses made it easy to
miss two important caveats that later Courts would use to
cabin the decision's broad sweep. First, the Court qualified its
extension of First Amendment rights by noting that they were
"applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment," 87 suggesting that whatever the scope of
students' rights, they were not~contrary to Justice Stewart's
fear~the same freedoms adults enjoyed outside of school.
Second, borrowing language from a Fifth Circuit case, the
Court provided a two-prong standard for student speech.
Provided that school administrators do not suppress speech out
of a "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and displeasure that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint," 88 they can restrict
student speech that "'materially and substantially interfer[es]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school"' or "collid[es] with the rights of
others." 89 And, as many mischievous students have learned,

88. /d.
81. Id. at 512 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, :l85 U.S. 589, 60:l (1967)).
85. Id. at 509.
86. Id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 506 (majority opinion). This phrase opened the door to schools' inclusion
in the Court's Fourth Amendment "special needs" doctrine. See New .Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. :325, :311, n.6 (1985) (citing various sources in n.2 of the majority opinion
supporting a special needs approach).
88. ld. at 509.
89. ld. at 518 (citing Burnside v. Byars, :36:3 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1966)). The Court
immediately restated this standard to apply to behavior that "materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others," although
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"material and substantial interference" is a nebulous standard
that has been largely defined in the eye of the school
administrator.
Taken on balance, then, the Tinker Court, albeit in perhaps
unnecessarily bombastic language, presents a student-centered
conception of the Government as Educator in which students,
guided along by cooperative-not authoritarian-educators,
actively learn citizenship by acting as proto-citizens in school.
Contrary to Justice Black's dissent, Tinker did not itself usher
in this "new revolutionary era of permissiveness" in schools. 90
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, American
education was headed down that that road long before, 91 and
certainly not because, Mary Beth Tinker's peace sign-sporting
armband "practically 'wrecked"' her math teacher's lesson. 92
Tinker represented just one aspect of a changing school
environment that increasingly allowed student autonomy in
areas ranging from curricular choice to classroom
participation. 93 At an even larger level, 94 Tinker was of a piece
with other contemporaneous social changes that were reflected
in schools and school policies. 95 During the same period, for
example, the Court considered cases involving the teaching of
evolution in public schools, 96 the right to control student
picketers, 97 the due process rights of students facing short-term
suspensions, 98 the liability of school officials for damages, 99 the
many analyses use the different renderings interchangeably. Compare, e.g., Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 40:-l (2007) with 551 U.S. at 117 (Thomas, J., concurring) and
551 U.S. at 423-21 (Alito, J., concurring) and 551 U.S. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) and 551 U.S. at 136-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Tinher, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
91. See, e.g., RAVITCH, supra note 15.
92. Tinher, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
93. See, e.g., A.HTHUR G. POWELL, ELEANOR Fi\lWAR & DAVID K. COHEN, THE
SHOPPIN(; MALL HIGH SCHOOL (1985).
94. The growth of rights-consciousness activity increased especially rapidly after
the Second World War with the accelerating of the Civil Rights Movement. See
generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS (1996).
95. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIS'I'OHY OF AM~;I{ICAN LAW 523-:n (3d
ed. 2001).
96. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down a state law that
prohibited teaching evolution because the theory conflicted with the Bible).
97. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 108 U.S. 101 (1972) (upholding an ordinance that
prohibited substantially disruptive noise, but striking down a blanket ordinance
proscribing picketing near schools).
98. Goss v. Lopez, 119 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (providing students "rudimentary"
due process rights even for short-term disciplinary suspensions).
99. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (requiring good faith efforts to qualify
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propriety of corporal punishment, 100 and the rights of
undocumented immigrant students to attend public school. 101
C. The Teacher-Centered Strand's Renaissance
Few of the Court's similarly student-centered decisions,
however, have incurred the opprobrium heaped upon Tinker by
those who, like Justice Thomas, believe that the decision was
"without basis in the Constitution" and "extend[ed] [student's
speech rights] well beyond traditional bounds." 102 Critics of the
decision would argue in the following years for a resurgent
teacher-centered view of the Government as Educator, 103
claiming that the Court had impermissibly installed itself in
that role in place of legislative authorities and school
policymakers and deprived them the institutional authority
and legitimacy necessary to grapple with the broader social
changes of the late-1960s and early-1970s. 104 Justice Black's
warning that Tinker portended the day when students "in all
schools will be ready, able, and willing to defy their teachers on
practically all orders" 105 seemed in retrospect "prophetic," 106 as
social changes manifested themselves in schools in the form of
increased conflict between students and educators, school
violence, drug use, student apathy, and the degeneration of
longstanding social norms. 107 In some sense, Ingraham u.
Wright's preservation of corporal punishment against an
Eighth Amendment challenge in 1977 represented more a
repudiation of the perceived failure of student-centered
approaches to maintain discipline in schools than a real

for immunity from liability).
100. Ingraham v. Wright, 130 U.S. 651 (1977) (upholding corporal puni~hment).
101. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (allowing undocumented students a frPe
and appropriate public education).
102. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. :19:-l, 410, 416 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
103. Goss, 419 U.S. at 590 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[S]chool authorities must have
broad discretionary authority in the daily operation of public schools. This includes
wide latitude with respect to maintaining discipline and good order." (citing Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :393 U.S. 503, 507 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
104. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson Ill, Goss u. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School
Superintendent, 1975 SUP. CT. Rrw. 25 (1975).
105. Tinker, 39;:3 U.S. at 525 (Black, ,J ., dissenting).
106. Morse, 551 U.S. at 421 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
107. See, e.g., GERALD GRANT, THE WORLD WE CREATED i\T HAMILTON HinH 24-76
(1988).
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defense of physical punishment as a means of ensurmg
order. 108
Since Tinker, the Court has revisited student speech in K12 schools on three occasions, each time ruling against the
student. The Court has also created a line of cases concerning
students' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches, ruling against the student in all but the most recent,
Safford, which, as described in the Introduction, was not
necessarily a victory for students' rights. In these cases, the
Court has reemphasized a teacher-centered conception of the
Government as Educator, but one that seems focused on
inculcating morals, rather than patriotism, and prohibiting,
rather than compelling, student activity. Accordingly, the
Court's modern teacher-centered Government as Educator
promotes a values curriculum of greater potential scope
because its tenets are derived from the moral sensibilities of
school authorities, which encompass a more expansive array of
matters than those associated with traditional patriotismbased approaches.
This does not mean that education-for-citizenship rhetoric
has disappeared from the Court's student speech and school
search-related opinions. Instead, the inculcation of moral
sensibilities has been clothed in the language of education for
citizenship. The Court has not abandoned student-centered
conceptions of the Government as Educator, but they have been
relegated to dissenting opinions.

1. Student Speech
Although the timing was almost certainly coincidental, the
release of A Nation at Risk, a report by the National
Committee on Excellence in Education that was sharply critical
of the state of American education, 109 within a year of the film
Fast Times at Ridgemont High seemingly could not have been
planned any better. 110 A Nation at Risk's dire warning that the
"educational foundations of our society [were] being eroded by a

108. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 681, n.53 (1977) (5-4 decision) (noting that
"corporal punishment serves important educational interests" and that the Court's
"judgment must be viewed in light of the disciplinary problems commonplace in the
schools," which the majority deemed "seriousO").
109. NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK
(1983).
110. FAST TIMES AT lilllGEMONT HIGH (Universal Pictures 1982).
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nsmg tide of mediocrity" 111 could have been directed at Jeff
Spicoli,
the
habitually-tardy,
ordering-pizza-in-class,
surfer/stoner-cum-Falstaff of Fast Times. 112 A Nation at Risk,
"uniquely a document of the early 1980s," capitalized on a
"heap of public discontent about schooling that had been
accumulating since the sixties" and reignited a national debate
on the sorry state of American public schools and low student
achievement. 113 Given this environment, it is perhaps
unsurprising that two of the earliest cases cutting against the
student-centered Government as Educator, Bethel School
District v. Fraser and New Jersey v. T.L.O., involved students
engaging in stereotypical teenage misbehavior: giVmg a
sexually-suggestive speech at a school assembly and smoking
cigarettes in a school bathroom. T.L.O., a search case, will be
discussed below.
The facts of Fraser almost seem too innocuous to have gone
all the way to the Supreme Court. 114 In the spring of 1983, a
high school senior gave a nominating speech for a friend at a
school assembly. 115 The majority opinion did not excerpt the
speech, instead describing it only as "an elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor." 116 Justice Brennan, believing the
speech to be far from "lewd" but impermissible for a school
setting, included the speech in his concurrence:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in
his shirt, his character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief
in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man
who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in
spurts--he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finallyhe succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even
the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for

111. A Ni\TION AT RISK, supra note 109.
112. FAST TlMES AT RIDGEMONT HIGH, supra note 110 (describing, for example, a
critical moment in U.S. History: "What Jefferson was saying was, 'Hey! You know, we
left this England place 'cause it was bogus; so if we don't get some cool rules
ourselves-pronto-we'll just be bogus too!'").
113. Raviteh, A Historic Document, in 0UH SCHOOLS & OUR FUTURE 29-:10 (Paul E.
Peterson ed., 2003).
114. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40:1 v. Fraser, 178 U.S. 675 (1986).
115. Jd. at 677.
116. /d. at 678.
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A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the
best our high school can be. 117

School officials suspended Fraser for a few days and
revoked his privilege to speak at graduation, although this
latter sanction was eventually reconsidered. He nonetheless
sued, claiming that the district had violated his civil rights,
and won in both lower courts. 118
The Supreme Court, however, ruled against Fraser in an
opinion that limited the scope of allowable student speech
under Tinker by cabining off an exception for "sexually explicit,
indecent, or lewd speech." 119 Although the district made no
showing that Fraser's remarks had disrupted the educational
process, 120 a key part of the Tinker analysis, the Court read in
an implied corollary to the substantial-disruption prong
providing that "the schools, as instruments of the state, may
determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct
cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or
offensive speech," even in the absence of a substantial
disruption. 121 And, citing Tinker itself, the Court reasoned that
once this interest in promoting good conduct was accepted, the
school was justified in "inculcating" students with such "shared
values of a civilized order." 122 On the whole, this was not a
terribly controversial conclusion: it did little more than
officially deputize school officials in the "War Against Bad
Words," a war that school officials had been fighting for
generations without an institution as august as the Supreme
Court's formal recognition.
Yet, the decision's robust language, harkening back to
Gobitis and a strongly teacher-centered conception of the
Government as Educator, suggested that Fraser's reach might
be greater than it first appeared. For one thing, there was the
fact that the majority had taken mildly off-color student speech
that would pass as a "routine comment" in the halls and locker
rooms of many American schools 123 and pronounced it "sexually

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
(1967)).
123.

/d. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 103 v. Fraser, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985).
Fraser, 4 78 U.S. at 684.
ld. at 690 (Marshall, J ., dissenting).
/d. at 683.
ld. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
/d. at 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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explicit," "lewd," "indecent," "offensive," and the product of a
"confused boy." 124 Such descriptors seemed inapposite given the
lack of a substantial disruption, 125 but the Court's
characterization nonetheless gave school administrators
judicial sanction to portray similarly mild student speech in
stark terms. This gave school authorities a tactical blueprint to
end-around Tinker by allowing them to use characterizations of
student actions as a proxy for or predictor of substantial
disruption, effectively decreasing the realm in which students
could potentially exercise Tinker's "hazardous freedom."
Outside of the student-speech context, the same tactic surfaces
in zero-tolerance student discipline policies that, for example,
consider a six-year-old's Cub Scout-approved "camping utensil"
containing a fork, knife, and spoon, a dangerous "weapon." 126
Moreover, the tone of the education-for-citizenship
language in the Fraser majority's opmwn enlisted the
Government as Educator as inculcator of more than just the
values of polite conversation. Fraser exhorted school
authorities to take up the battle of inculcating the
"fundamental values of 'habits and manners of civility'
essential to a democratic society" and teaching students "the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." 127 Again, not
entirely objectionable goals in and of themselves. The Court,
however, fashioned this mission from two different sources of
authority, tailoring it to fit Fraser's facts, and retaining the
original sources' strong education-for-citizenship rhetoric, 12 x

124. Id. at 683-84. Justice Stevens later took pams to note that Fraser was
actually "an outstanding young man with a fine academic record.'' !d. at 692 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "the school counselor whose
testimony the District relies upon, [said] the reaction of the student body 'was not
atypical to a high school auditorium assembly,"' and arguing that "a noisy response to
the speech and sexually suggestive movements by three students in a crowd of 600 fail
to rise to the level of a material interference with the educational process'').
126. See Ian Urbina, It's a Fork, It:s a Spoon, it's a ... Weapon?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 2009, at A1.
127. Fraser, 178 U.S. at 681.
128. The majority cites an historical work by the Beards for the idea that '"[pjublic
education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic .... It must inculcate the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as
indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation." !d.
(citing CHARLES A. BEAHD & MARY R. B~:AIW, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF 'I'HE UNITED
STATES 228 (1968)). It then joined this to Ambach v. Norwich's similar description.
which saw the "objectives of public education as the 'inculcat[ion of] fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."' !d. (citing 111
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which in their original contexts were concerned much more
with the inculcation of socio-political democratic values than
hazy notions of what essentially amounted to democratic
politeness. As with the allegedly self-evident concept of "good
citizenship" from an earlier era, the Court failed to give
definition to these "fundamental values" and "socially
appropriate behavior" other than to suggest that they excluded
Fraser-like offensive speech. This definitional process, the
Fraser Court opined, belonged to the same local educational
authorities suspected of near-subversive activities in
Barnette. 129 And, instilling these apparently school-board
defined "values is truly the 'work of the schools."' 130
Fraser, however, did more than exhume Gobitis's schoolboard deferential rhetoric-it expanded it. Near the end of the
Fraser majority's opinion, the decision suggests that school
authorities have the right to "disassociate" from student
actions that are "wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental
values' of public school education" or serve to "undermine the
school's basic educational mission." 131 Indeed, the school
district in Morse made exactly this argument nearly twenty
years later while attempting to justify a principal's decision to
take down a student banner that she regarded as advocating
drug use. 132 Thus, the Court enhanced school boards' authority
to proscribe student speech behavior far beyond that directly at
issue in Fraser; because as school authorities define those
fundamental values and educational missions, those values
necessarily will shift with prevailing societal assumptions and
expectations about schooling. And, as those values become

U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
129. !d. at 683 ("The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or
in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.").
130. Jd. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1967)). This is arguably a disingenuous use of the "work of the schools" language in
Tinker. The phrase "work of the school" appears only three times in Tinker, and then in
contexts that strongly suggest the Tinker Court used the phrase to refer to the normal
operation of schools rather than the inculcation of any values. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at
508 (" ... this case docs not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the
schools or the rights of other students.") ("There is no indication that the work of the
schools or any class was disrupted.") (" ... our independent examination of the record
fails to yield evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the
wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students.").
131. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
1::32. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 39::3, 397-98 (2007).

150

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2011

more teacher-centered, students experience correspondingly
less-solicitous treatment of their autonomy-related interests.
This line of thought runs directly contrary to Tinker's spirit,
which envisioned students exerc1smg relatively static
constitutional rights as practicing proto-citizens. Instead, it
allows school authorities the power to affirmatively define
student rights in myriad ways.
One other notable shift towards teacher-centeredness in
Fraser concerns the Court's depiction of high school students as
a captive and vulnerable population. 133 The Fraser Court
justified its decision in part based on a case which upheld the
right of the FCC to regulate "indecent but not obscene"
broadcasts during hours children might listen to the radio
because children are a vulnerable population in need of
protection. 134 Recently, this argument has resurfaced in at
least one student "hate speech" case that relied on Tinker's
second prong concerning the "rights of others," 135 and at least
one commentator has viewed the same line of argumentation
as justifying a "student welfare" standard for regulating
student speech. 136 This contrasts with the tone of Tinker, which
suggests that schools are not only capable of tolerating
offensive language that does not substantially disrupt school
operations, but that they are places where students should be
able to acclimate themselves to a relatively unregulated and
hurly-burly "real world" of discourse on the other side of high
school graduation. Taken together, the Court, now with a more
conservative membership, had essentially signaled to school
officials that values-based education and discipline were once
again permissible-and desirable-goals; the student-centered
approach to Government as Educator could be tempered.

1:1:1. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684 (citing cases "recogniz[ingj the obvious concern on the
part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect childrenespecially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd
speech").
1:14. /d. at 681-85 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 1:18 U.S. 726 (1 978)). Pacifica
concerned George Carlin's famous "Seven Dirty Words" stand-up routine.
135. See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 115 F.:3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006);
see also Brian J. Bilford, Harper's Bazaar: The Marketplace of Ideas and Hate Speech in
Schools, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 117 (2008) (analyzing Harper, its effects, and alternative
grounds for regulating hate speech in schools).
1:16. See Francisco M. Ner,>Ton, Jr., A Foot in the Dour( The Unwitting Move
Towards a ''New" Student Welfare Standard in Student Speech after Morse v.
Frederick, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1221 (2009).
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The Court continued to cabin Tinker in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier. 137 Compared to Fraser, the facts in
Kuhlmeier conjured up an image of much greater apparent
constitutional significance, at least in the abstract: freedom of
the press. In Kuhlmeier, a high school principal removed two
pages of articles from a school's student-run newspaper out of
various content-related objections. The offending articles
discussed divorce, pregnancy, birth control, and teenage sex,
and the principal, among other objections, believed that the
articles insufficiently protected the confidentiality of some
student sources and also contained material unsuitable for
some students. 138 Several journalism students sued, arguing
that the principal's censorship violated their First Amendment
rights.
Again, the Court worked around the Tinker standard by
largely ignoring it, even though the Eighth Circuit panel
below-like the lower courts in Fraser-felt compelled to follow
a substantial-disruption approach. 139 Instead, the Court
questioned whether or not the school newspaper was a public
forum. 140 As the product of the school's "Journalism II" class,
the Court held that the newspaper was not a public forum
because students primarily used it for applying lessons learned
from the course's curriculum. 141 The Court could have ended
the inquiry there and decided the case on narrow grounds: no
forum, no First Amendment rights. The Court, however, went
on to address the broader issue of "whether the First
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote
particular student speech." 142 That question, according to the
Court, "concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents and members of the public

137. 48~ u.s. 260(1988).
138. ld. at 262-65.
139. /d. at 26~-65; Kuhlmcier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir.
1986).
140. ~8~ U.S. at 270 (It is this [forum] standard, rather than our decision in
Tinker, that governs this case.").
141. !d. at 267-70 (ruling that "school facilities may he deemed to he public forums
only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for
indiscriminate use by the general public" (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
B:ducators' Ass'n, ~60 U.S. 87, 47 (19Kl))).
142. !d. at 270-71.
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might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school." 143
This framing virtually ensures that school administrators
will have a long list of subjective and apparently curricularrelated factors, beyond the Tinker and Fraser standards, at
their disposal from which they can easily craft a justifiable
excuse for regulating student speech. 144 At one point, the
opinion even suggests that educators can regulate student
speech made pursuant to curricular activities when the speech
leads a school authority to believe that a third party could
believe, even erroneously, that the speech reflects the school's
endorsement. 145 These school-authority expanding possibilities
are subtly woven into the Kuhlmeier Court's ultimate holding,
which sounds reasonable enough on a first reading: "educators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 146 But
neither "school-sponsored expressive activities" nor "legitimate
pedagogical concerns" serve as a useful protection of student
speech when both components are defined by the same
educational authorities they ostensibly regulate.
Like Fraser, Kuhlmeier sees the Court taking a case of
narrow scope and application, and easily decidable under
Tinker, 147 and expanding the teacher-centered Government as
Educator's role to include inculcating moral and ethical values.
In Kuhlmeier, this is not only evident from the Court's laundry
list of legitimate pedagogical factors that could justify
restricting student speech, 14R but also its broad interpretation
of Fraser's standard. In Kuhlmeier, the Court cites Fraser for
the proposition that "a school must also retain the authority to
113. ld. at 271.
144. Id. at 271-72 (discussing various subjective factors, including speaker and
audience maturity, quality of speech and presentation, adequacy of student research,
potential bias, topic sensitivity. portrayals of teenage sexuality, and even student
speech that might "associate the school with any position other than neutrality on
matters of political controversy").
145. Id. at 271 ("Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over [curricularrelated student speech] to assure ... that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school.").
146. !d. at 273.
147. This was, in fact, ,Justice Brennan's position. See id. at 277-291 (Brennan .•J.,
dissenting).
148. Id. at 271-72; see also supra, note 128.
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refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or
conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values of a
civilized social order."' 149 But Fraser had nothing to do with
drugs or alcohol-those words appear nowhere in the
decision-and Fraser's speech advocated, at most, irresponsible
sexual humor. Yet, citing no less a revered opinion than Brown
v. Board of Education, the Kuhlmeier Court explicitly
conscripts educators into a Government-as-Moral-Educator
construct, arguing that schools "must" regulate student speech
regarding such issues "[o]therwise, the schools would be unduly
constrained from fulfilling their role as 'a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment.'" 150
It would take almost two decades, but the Court would
follow Kuhlmeier to its logical conclusion in its most recent
student speech case, Morse v. Frederick. 151 Morse gained
nationwide attention not only because it was the first student
speech case to reach the Court in nearly twenty years, but
because the focus of the case was a high school senior's
fourteen-foot banner that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS." 152 Like
Fraser, Morse's background facts featured standard-issue
immature teenage behavior. In January 2002, administrators
at a high school in Juneau, Alaska, dismissed class for part of
the school day to observe the Olympic Torch Relay, which was
passing through Juneau en route to the Olympic Winter Games
in Salt Lake City. 153 The Relay route caused the Torch to pass
down the same street as the high school, where students had
lined both sides of the road. As the Torch approached, a group
of students revealed the "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner. The
school principal suspended one of the students for ten days
because "she thought [the banner] encouraged illegal drug use,

149. /d. at 272 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 103 v. Fraser, 178 U.S. 675, 683
(1986)).
150. !d. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., :317 U.S. 483, 493 (1951)).
151. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
152. /d. at :397. Indeed, Morse is often referred to simply as "Bong Hits." See, e.g.,
Sean K Nuttall, Note, Rethinhing the Narrative in Student Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1282, 128:3 (2008) (referring to Morse throughout as "the Bong Hits case" and

"Bong Hits").
153. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
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in violation of established school policy." 154 The student
claimed that the banner was '"nonsense meant to attract
television cameras."' 155
A plurality of the Court ruled that the student did not have
a First Amendment right to show a "pro-drug banner" at a
school-sponsored event, holding "that schools may take steps to
safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can
reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use." 156
Regardless of what meaning the student assigned to the
banner's "cryptic" words, Chief Justice Roberts's plurality
opinion argued that the banner made an "undeniable reference
to illegal drugs" and as such there was "no meaningful
distinction between celebrating illegal drug use in the midst of
fellow students and outright advocacy or promotion." 157 And, in
a merger of student speech and school search doctrine, the
Court argued that schools had an "important" if not
"compelling"
interest
in
"deterring
drug
use
by
158
schoolchildren."
Combined with evidence of a "serious"
national drug problem, 159 Congress's apparent "declar[ation]
that part of a school's job is educating students about the
dangers of illegal drug use," 160 and the familiar "'special
characteristics of the school environment,"' 161 the Morse
plurality saw no constitutional barrier to "allow[ing] schools to
restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as
promoting illegal drug use." 162
Differing opinions on Morse's scope, however, divided the
Court. Justice Alito wrote a separate concurrence that rejected
the idea that schools can "censor any student speech that
interferes with a school's 'educational mission,"' 163 an
expansive Fraser-based argument made by the district that
went unchallenged in the plurality opinion. Instead, Justice
Alito argued that the plurality holding restricted only student

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
(1969)).
162.
163.

I d. The suspension was later reduced to eight days.
Jd. at 101.
Id. at :~97.
I d. at 101-02.
Jd. at 107 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 17,J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
Id. (citing studies).
Id. at 408 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7111(d)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. lV)).
Jd. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :l9:l U.S. 503, 506
Id.
Id. at 42:3 (Alita, .J., concurring).
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speech that "a reasonable observer would interpret as
advocating illegal drug use" and not student speech that could
"plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or
social issue." 164 Beyond this, he did not believe Morse modified
or augmented Tinker, Fraser, or Kuhlmeier. 165
Yet, Morse potentially did more than "make good" on
Kuhlmeier's suggestion that regulating drug-related student
speech could be justified by the "shared values of a civilized
social order." Justice Alita's concurrence went on to suggest
that the "special characteristic of schools" at play in Morse was
that "schools can be places of special danger" that pose a
"threat to the physical safety of students." 166 The special
danger in Morse, according to Justice Alita, was student
"[s]peech advocating illegal drug use." 167 Ironically, rather than
cabining Morse's reach, this "physical safety" justification
provided
potential
grounds
for
expanding
school
administrators' authority to regulate student speech. 168

2. School Searches
Decided between Fraser and Kuhlmeier, T.L.O. applied for
the first time the Fourth Amendment to searches of students in
public schools. 169 Like its student-speech contemporaries,
T.L.O. created a standard that, while reasonable on its surface,
would eventually be used to justify a more teacher-centered
role for the Government as Educator. Unlike the student
speech cases, however, the student-search line of cases is tied
together by one overarching theme: the War on Drugs.
T.L.O., like Fraser and Morse, started as a case about
stereotypical high school misbehavior. T.L.O. was accused of
smoking cigarettes in a school bathroom, which she denied,
landing her in the office. During questioning, a school
administrator searched T.L.O.'s purse, uncovering not only the
164. !d. at 122.
165. !d.
166. !d. at 124-25.
167. /d. at 425.
168. Some lower courts have already seized on this "physical safety" rationale. See,
e.g, !'once v. Socorro lndep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that a
student's allegedly creative-writing style diary entries, containing plotlines in which
acts of mass violence were committed at school by the student and fictional characters,
were not entitled to First Amendment protection because they constituted threats
against the school population).
169. New .Jersey v. T.L.O., 169 U.S. 325 (1985).

156

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2011

suspected contraband cigarettes, but also drug paraphernalia.
A subsequent and more intensive search of the purse turned up
marijuana and evidence that T.L.O. had been dealing drugs on
campus. 170 T.L.O. sued to suppress the drug-related evidence,
arguing that the school administrator had violated her Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches when he
continued to search her purse after finding the cigarettes,
which were the only impermissible items that T.L.O. was
suspected of carrying. 171
The Court held that T.L.O. was entitled to the Fourth
Amendment's protection, but upheld the search of her purse on
a novel "reasonableness" standard, which, given the "special
characteristics" inherent in the school environment, was a
lower standard of protection than probable cause. 172 The
reasonableness standard consists of two parts: an inquiry into
whether the search was "justified at its inception," and an
examination of the search's scope. Within those two parts, the
Court gave further guidance:
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a
teacher or other school official will be "justified at its
inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. 173

Although this standard was derived almost from whole
cloth, 174 the Court believed that the reasonableness standard
was a less confusing standard for educators because, unlike
probable cause or individualized suspicion, it did not come with
a complex legal history. Rather, the Court envisioned that the
reasonableness standard would allow school authorities to
respond quickly and flexibly to myriad situations by using

170. ld. at 328.
171. ld. at 329-33.
172. ld. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
17::3. ld. at 341-42 (majority opinion).
17 4. Id. at :154 (Brennan, ,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (advocating for
a probable cause standard).
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"common sense" while also protecting students from
unnecessary and invasive searches. 175
Given that school administrators had no guidance from the
Court prior to T.L.O., it is unclear whether the decision itself
pushed for a more teacher-centered or student-centered role for
the Government as Educator. Students likely had varying
experiences depending on the personalities of school
administrators and cultural norms in individual schools and
districts. The new standard, for example, might have increased
teacher-centeredness by empowering previously-reluctant
school authorities to feel more confident in taking action to
protect schools against a perceived increase in "drug use and
possession of weapons." 176 On the other hand, as Justice
Stevens indicated in his separate opinion, there undoubtedly
were overbearing school authorities for whom T.L.O. should
have served as a student-centered wake- up call. 177
Nevertheless, the majority clearly believed that it had
fashioned a standard that adequately accounted for the
concerns of both students and educators. 178
Even under a student-centered reading, however, T.L.O.like Tinker in the student speech context-contained the seeds
of an expansively teacher-centered Government as Educator.
As with Fraser, the Court provided little guidance to, but left
great discretion in, local school authorities. The majority
assumed that the reasonableness standard would "ensure that
the interests of students will be invaded no more than is
necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in
the schools" 179 But what is necessary to preserve order depends
on the contexts of individual schools and the beliefs of school
authorities, as demonstrated by Safford and other cases in
which school authorities continued to strip search students
long after T.L.O suggested that such searches were
unreasonable. 180 The reasonableness standard also arguably

175. !d. at :H:i (majority opinion).
176. !d. at a52~5a (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
177. /d. at :l82 n.25 (Stevens, ,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing
various strip search cases).
178. Id. at 8:38 (majority opinion) ("Although this Court may take notice of the
difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situation is not so
dire that students in the schools may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy.").
179. Id. at 81:3.
180. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2688, 2618~44 (2009) (citing
Thomas v. Roberts, :32:3 F.8d 950 (11th Cir. 2003) and Williams v. Ellington, 986 F.2d
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envisioned searches conducted to ferret out violations of school
rules in addition to unlawful activity. 181 Thus, regardless of the
T.L.O. Court's conception of the Government as Educator, in
practice the decision left open the teacher-centered possibility
that the reasonableness standard would allow the most
egregious searchers-of-students to continue their practices
unaltered and encourage more circumspect school authorities
to begin invasive searches for the first time.
The Court confronted two cases in this latter category in
Vernonia School District v. Acton 182 and Board of Education v.
Earls, 183 which upheld two school districts that conditioned
students' participation in extracurricular activities on their
consenting to suspicionless drug tests. Decided in 1995,
Vernonia blessed the then-emerging movement among school
authorities to fight student drug use through the randomized
drug testing of students involved in extracurricular athletics.
The case concerned such a program instituted by an Oregon
school district to combat an "epidemic" of student misbehavior
that "'was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as the
students' misperceptions about the drug culture"' promoted by
student-athlete campus leaders. 184 The school district reasoned
that testing student athletes would cause a trickle-down effect,
reducing drug use among students and preventing drug-related
athletic injuries. 185 Under the district's testing program, ten
percent of in-season athletes were randomly selected on a
weekly basis for urine tests. Those who tested positive were
required to either enter a treatment program or sit out of
athletics for at least the remainder of the season. 186
Citing the "special needs ... in the public school context"
that gave rise to T.L.O.'s reasonableness standard, 187 the Court
881 (6th Cir. 1991)).
181. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at :~71 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(" ... 1 fear that the concerns that motivated the Court's activism have produced a
holding that will permit school administrators to search students suspected of violating
only the most trivial school regulations and guidelines fur behavior.").
182. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
183. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Puttawatumie County v. Earls. 5:36
U.S. 822 (2002).
181. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 619 (citation omitted).
185. !d. at 619-50.
186. Jd. at 650-51.
187. !d. at 65:3 (arguing that the reasonableness standard is justified in schools
because "the warrant requirement 'would unduly interfere with the maintenanee of the
swift and informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed,' and 'strict adherence to
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upheld the drug tests as valid under the Fourth Amendment
even though the program did not require "individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing." 188 Justice Scalia's majority opinion
argued that students had greatly reduced expectations of
privacy in schools because they "are (1) children, who (2) have
been committed to the temporary custody the State as
schoolmaster," 189 a relationship that "is custodial and tutelary,
permitting [the State] a degree of supervision and control [over
students] that could not be exercised over free adults." 190
Because of this relationship, school authorities were justified in
using the "negligib[ly]" intrusive collection of urine samples to
meet their "important-indeed, perhaps compelling" interest in
"[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren." 191
Following Vernonia, school districts across the country
began experimenting with student drug testing. Although
many districts followed Vernonia's lead and established drug
testing policies only for student athletes, some saw the case as
justifying drug testing of all students engaged in
extracurricular activities, 192 and a few even attempted to
implement drug testing for all students. 193 Courts were also
divided on whether a district needed to show a history of drug
problems before implementing a drug test regime. 194 As
uncertainty about Vernonia's reach grew, so did calls for the
Court to revisit the issue. 195
the requirement that searches he based upon probable cause' would undercut 'the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools"' (citing New ,Jersey v. 'I'.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340, 341 (1985))).
188. /d. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8).
189. !d. at 654.
190. !d. at 655. Scalia also argued that students in general have greatly reduced
expectations of privacy because they are subject to vaccination policies, and that
student athletes in particular enjoy even less privacy because they engage in
"communal undress" for athletic activities and voluntarily agree to greater "regulation"
such as mandatory grade requirements and physical exams. /d. at 656-58.
191. Jd. at 660-6:3 (citing studies showing that teens are particularly vulnerable to
drug use).
192. See, e.g, Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding
drug testing of students engaged in non-athletic extracurricular activities).
193. See. e.!{.. Tannahill ex rel. Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp.
2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (striking down mandatory drug testing of all students enrolled
in district's middle and high schools).
191. See, e.g., Gardner ex rei. Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 2d
851, 856 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (striking down district's drug testing program because "no
major or widespread drug problem existed within any segment of the [district] student
body").
195. See, e.g., ,Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1067 (7th
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In Earls, the Court expanded permissible drug testing to
include students involved in non-athletic extracurricular
activities in schools with no "major" drug problem. 196 Citing the
existence of a "nationwide epidemic of drug use," the Court
disavowed that Vernonia's principles extended only to districts
which a long history of drug-related issues, "refus[ing] to
fashion what would in effect be a constitutional quantum of
drug use necessary to show a 'drug problem."' 197 As in
Vernonia, the Court also declined to impose an individualized
suspicion standard on school authorities, reasoning that such a
standard would unduly burden classroom teachers, who would
be forced to be the front line of defense against drug-using
students, 198 and "unfairly target members of unpopular
groups." 199 Instead, the majority opted to stick with T.L.O.'s
reasonableness standard and found that the program in Earls
was "a reasonably effective means" of fighting student drug
use.
In its holding, however, the Earls majority added a new
teacher-centered gloss to the scope of governmental interests at
stake in Vernonia. Where Vernonia mentioned only preventing
or deterring drug use, 200 Earls added that districts have a
"legitimate concern[] in ... detecting drug use." 201 The former

Cir. 2000) ("The scope of Vernonia remains undecided today. Until we receive further
guidance from the Supreme Court, we shall stand by .... ").
196. Bd. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 5:3fi
U.S. 822, 813 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing the Pottawatomie County
Superintendent's description of the perceived drug problem). The majority opinion.
authored by Justice Thomas, did cite instances of drug-related behavior that hardly
seem out of the ordinary for a high school of any size as sufficient evidence of a "drug
problem." The Court specifically cited as examples: district teachers seeing some
students "who appeared" to be on drugs and overhearing others talking about drug use,
finding "marijuana cigarettes" in the school parking lot, "once" discovering "drugs or
drug paraphernalia" in a student's car, and some district parents reporting concern
about "the 'drug situation."' Id. at 835.
197. Id. at 8:16.
198. It is not clear why the majority believed this to be so. as state statutes often
make teachers mandatory reporters for abuse and neglect. See, e.g, CAL. P"NAL Com:§
11165.7 (2009). Drug use, as an indicator of abuse, neglect, or other problems affecting
students' well-being, is already something for which educators are ethically obligated
to be on the lookout.
199. Earls, 53fi U.S. at 8:17.
200. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 17J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 6<16, fi50, 661 (1995) ("[The drug
testing program's] expressed purpose is to prevent student athletes from using drugs,
to protect their health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance
programs.").
201. Earls, 536 U.S. at 8:18 (italics added).
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interest does not require districts to take an active role;
districts could deter drug use by passive mechanisms such as
increasing drug-prevention education or voluntary on-campus
drug counseling programs. These forms potentially preserve a
greater role for student autonomy. The latter interest, however,
obliges the Government as Educator to affirmatively identify
student drug users.
As the previous Part has argued, the Court's conception of
the Government as Educator has evolved to support an
expansive teacher-centered role in both the student speech and
school search contexts. This evolution is significant because
student speech and school search cases force the Court to
balance the rights of students directly against the perceived
"special needs" of school authorities in a way unlike other areas
of school-related law such as school finance, alternative
governance, or student religious expression. Put in terms of the
pedagogical lens used throughout this Article, student speech
and school search cases see the Government as Educator in its
most direct interactions with its students. Thus, in articulating
these strands of opinions, the Court not only expounds legal
doctrine, it helps "inculcate" various values and social
expectations related to the operation of the nation's public
schools and the responsibilities of students. As a result, the
Court's conception of the Government as Educator's proper role
and scope of authority influences the public's ideas about the
Government as Educator. 202 This does not mean that the Court
always drives education-related public opinion; as observed
earlier in this Article, the Court often settles "cases and
controversies" resulting from long-percolating educational
disputes.
In student speech and school search cases over the last
quarter-century, however, the Court has settled those disputes
by favoring the teacher-centered interests of school authorities
in securing order and instilling values over students' interests
in experiencing education for citizenship free of unnecessary
"measures that diminish constitutional protections." 203
Moreover, the Court has essentially delegated to school
authorities the responsibility for deciding not only whether

202. !d. at 855 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Government is nowhere more a
teacher than when it runs a public school.").
20:3. !d.
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measures are necessary but also if they are permissible. Rather
than simply tilting the playing field in favor of school
authorities, the Court has allowed them to write the rulebook.
In doing so, the Court has left it up to educators to define the
Government as Educator, allowing the values of school
authorities to substitute for the values historically associated
with education for citizenship. But if the "government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher," 204 what does this approach
mean for schools and students?
III. CONSEQUENCES
The idea that "school officials should be accorded the widest
authority in maintaining discipline and good order in their
institutions," 205 in and of itself, probably does not offend the
sensibilities of many except the most libertarian-minded.
Without some order in schools, the educational process would
grind to a halt; schools would indeed come to exemplify Justice
Alito's "places of special danger." That being said, there is a
difference between according the "widest authority absolutely"
and the "widest authority necessary"-a difference analogous to
that between a teacher-centered and student-centered
conception of the Government as Educator. As argued in Part
II, the Court's student speech and school search caselaw has
evolved in a more teacher-centered direction over the last three
decades. Whether this shift was motivated out of a desire to
simply avoid acting as the nation's school board or a conscious
decision to empower school authorities, the Court's deference to
educators' goals has consequences beyond abstract legal
doctrine. Three of these consequences are analyzed below.

A. The Educationalization of the Government as Educator
As the expansion of the reasonableness standard from
general school-based searches for contraband to the drug
testing of students involved in extracurricular activities
demonstrates, allowing educators to define the Government as
Educator promotes educational authorities' ever-expanding

204. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 138, 185 (1928) (Brandeis, .J., dissenting).
205. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :l9:l U.S. 50:l, 526 (1969)
(Harlan, J ., dissenting).
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social agenda for the public schools. For a variety of reasons,2° 6
public schools in the United States today are expected to solve
myriad social problems ranging from "ameliorat[ing] race and
class inequality" to encouraging "healthy eating . . . and
preservation of natural resources." 207 This "educationalizing" of
social problems results in part from a desire to "pursue our
social goals in a way that is in line with the individualism at
the heart of the liberal ideal, aiming to solve social problems by
seeking to change the hearts, minds, and capacities of
individual students,"208 and in part because educators tend to
share a messianic "vision of saving the world by fixing the
child." 209 As a result, "educationalization has consistently
pushed education to expand its scope well beyond both what it
should do and what it can do," even though the "result is a
record of one failure after another." 210
In this light, student drug testing in public schools, by
further extending the War on Drugs into America's classrooms,
represents a classic case of educationalizing a social problem.
In the context of this Article, more importantly, it also presents
a case in which the Court's conception of the Government as
Educator has fostered educationalization. Indeed, the growth of
the student drug testing movement tracks the Court's decisions
in Vernonia and Earls. Prior to Vernonia, only about twenty
schools in the entire country engaged in student drug
testing; 211 by the time the Court decided Earls in 2002 that
number had increased to over a thousand. 212 Studies conducted
after Earls indicate that at least fourteen percent of all school
districts use some form of student drug testing, 213 and the
evidence suggests that the number is "rapidly increasing."214
Beyond a district-by-district approach, some states have used
Vernonia and Earls to justify the creation of statewide steroid

206. See, e.g., Laharee, supra note 23, at 449-55 (discussing eight reasons for
educationalization's success).
207. !d. at 447.
208. !d. at 118.
209. !d. at 151.
210. !d. at 118.
211. Kyle Barrington, Voluntary, Randomized, Student Drug Testing: Impact in a
Rural, Low-income Community, 52 .J. ALCOHOL & DRUG EDUC. 47, 49 (2008).
212. ld.
213. See, e.g., Chris Rin!-,>walt, et. a!., Random Drug Testing in US Public School
Districts. 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 826 (2008).
211. Barrington, supra note 211, at 49.
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testing regimes for student athletes, 215 implemented-not
coincidentally-in the wake of Congress's hearings on steroid
use in baseball. 216
The educationalization of the War on Drugs, moreover, did
not simply proceed out of Vernonia and Earls's holdings, which
as a formal matter simply pronounced student drug testing as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Rather, as Justice
Breyer's concurrence in Earls makes clear, 217 at least some
Justices on the Court intended that precise result. In
supporting the Earls majority's opinion, Justice Breyer felt
compelled to "emphasize several underlying considerations,"
which he "underst[ood] to be consistent with the Court's
opinion." 218 Acknowledging that drugs posed a "serious"
problem "in terms of size, the kinds of drugs being used, and
the consequences of that use both for our children and
[society]," Justice Breyer argued that the "government's
emphasis on supply side interdiction" had failed to stop teenage
drug use. 219 Solving this problem, according to Justice Breyer,
fell to public schools, 220 but not simply because student drug
testing attempted to reduce student demand for drugs "by
changing the school's environment" in a way that mitigated
peer pressure-induced drug use. 221 He was clear that public
schools must shoulder greater responsibility for fighting the
War on Drugs because the public had come to expect schools to
solve social problems. 222 In other words, conducting drug tests
on students is acceptable because society expects schools to
educationalize-even if that means usmg suspicionless
215. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 33.091 (Vernon's 2008). The first version of
Texas's steroid testing program was passed in 2005. See, H. B. :J56:l, 79th Leg., (Tex.
2005).
216. See Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: /~valuating Major Lea!Jue
Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the Comm. on Gov't Reform.
109th Cong. (2005).
217. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 5:l6
U.S. 822, 8;)8 (2002) (Breyer, .J., concurring).
218. Jd. at 8:39.
219. fd.
220. ld. at 810 ("[P]ublic school systems must find effective ways to deal with this
problem.").
221. Id. at 840-11.
222. ld. at 840 ("Today's public expects its schools not simply to teach the
fundamentals, but 'to shoulder the burden of feeding students breakfast and lunch,
offering before and after school child care services, and providing medical and
psychological services,' all in a school environment that is safe and encourages
learning.").
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searches or, even after Safford, strip searches. And,
educationalization of the War on Drugs has not been confined
to the school search context; the Morse plurality opinion cited
and quoted extensively from the Court's school search line of
cases. 223
The
Court's
teacher-centered
deference
to
educationalization in the student speech and school search
contexts cannot be explained away as simply the recognition of
social phenomenon outside the Court's bailiwick or limitations
on institutional competency. 224 The Court, after all, has
stepped in to referee other disputes concerning local school
authorities' attempts at managing social problems through the
public schools. In the context of religious expression, for
example, the Court has acted to police the use of public schools
as a means to inculcate religious values both at the hands of
school authorities 225 and students. 226 The Court also held
constitutional the use of school "vouchers" by recognizing, at
least in part, their use by underprivileged students and their
families as a potential alternative to failing public schools. 227
And, perhaps most famously, the Court itself ordered the
educationalization of desegregation, first, paradoxically, in the
lightly-regulated realm of higher education228 and then in the
K-12 public schools. 229

22:1. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 406-09 (2007).
221. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2640, n.1
(2009) ("[Tjhe legitimacy of the rule usually goes without saying as it does here. The
Court said plainly in [T.L.O.J that standards of conduct for schools are for school
administrators to determine without second-guessing by courts lacking the experience
to appreciate what may be needed.").
225. See l~ngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer); see also Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (clergy-led nondenominational invocation at
graduation); l~dwards v. Aguillard, 182 U.S. 578 (1987) (teaching creationism in public
schools).
226. See Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 5:JO U.S. 290 (2000) (student-led
invocation over public address system).
227. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 6:39 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("While the romanticized ideal of universal public education resonates with the
cognoscenti who oppose vouchers, poor urban families just want the best education for
their children, who will certainly need it to function in our high-tech and advanced
society.").
228. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 3:39 U.S. 629 (1950) (desegregated law schools);
see also McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 6:n (1950) (decided the same day as
Sweatt, dese~o'Tegated higher education generally).
229. See, e.g, Brown v. Bd. of gduc., il4 7 U.S. 483 (1954).
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B. Real Schools and Legitimacy Squared
It may be, then, that some members of the Court have come
to expect "real schools" to act in certain ways in the student
speech and school search contexts. Justice Breyer suggested as
much when he intimated that those schools failing to
"adequately to carry out [their] responsibilities" to combat
certain social problems "may well see parents send their
children to private or parochial school instead." 230 If so, the
Court has created a Catch-22: If today education is seen as a
"legitimating system," 231 so too is the Supreme Court. 232 Thus,
when the Court upholds certain school-related practices, it
gives added legitimacy to processes that already have been
legitimized by virtue of being implemented by school
authorities. This "legitimacy cycle" not only reduces the
probability of successfully challenging such practices in the
short-run, it drives societal-expectations regarding the
appropriate structure and functions of public schools. In the
long-run, these processes become permanent fixtures of
schooling.
In education reform literature, the "Real Schools" construct
addresses the paradoxical similarity of public schools given
greatly varied on-the-ground realities. 233 In the classic
exposition of the construct, Mary Metz observed several
different public schools use what appeared to be a "common
script" in matters ranging from curriculum to school
management. 234 Under the common script, teachers assigned
similar work from the same textbooks and taught students in a
similar manner, all seemingly without regard to the
background differences of their students. 235 Underneath this
superficial equality of treatment across schools, however, Metz
found that educators and administrators greatly "watered

230. Bd. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v.

l~arls, 5~l6

U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).

231. See, e.g., John W. Meyer, The Effects of Education as an Institution, 8:i AM. J.
Soc. 55, 73 (1977) ("Once institutionalized education is seen as a legitimating system-not just a mechanism for allocating fixed opportunities-it can have many net
consequences on both allocation and socialization of people being processed, just as on
the rest of society.").
232. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMEI{, THE PEOI'LE THEM>;t;;LV";s: I'OI'UL!\1{
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ,JUDICIAL REV I ";w (2004).
2:~3. See, e.g., Metz, supra note 24.
234. !d. at 76.
2:35. !d. at 76--79.
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down" expectations in certain schools. 236 In one majorityminority, high-poverty high school, for example, Metz found
that a "formal curriculum as demanding as that in our highest
SES schools, including texts and primary readings that were
just as difficult, was contradicted by student skills and written
work that were infinitely weaker." 237
Nonetheless, Metz saw the same common script at work in
school after school, a phenomenon she called "Real School": the
replication and reproduction of certain institutional norms that
"assured all participants that they were teaching and learning
in a Real School" and were "Real Teachers and Real
Students." 238 Besides this symbolic "ritual" purpose, 239 Metz
attributed the prevalence of the common script to Americans'
concern for equality; they "want to be able to assume that all
schools follow a common template and can be said to be offering
the same, commonly understood and commonly valued, high
school education." 240 Educational authorities replicate the
common script because society has come to see in its
manifestations a "guarantor of equity across schools."241 Thus,
society looks askance at deviations from the common script and
perceives as legitimate those processes that, through custom,
practice, or policy, have managed to become the script's
component parts. 242
The educationalization of social problems presents a
potential new component to Metz's common script: the idea
that Real Schools educationalize. To the extent society expects
public education as an institution to take on an expanded social
mission, educationalization itself correspondingly becomes a
legitimate part of school's structure. This is consonant with
organizational theory that suggests large formal organizations
like school expand in part by incorporating into their
structures the means to address emerging "rationalized

23G. /d. at 78-79.
237. /d. at 83. For example, Metz observed an English class filled with students
who could not write a simple business letter, but who were also expected to read
Dante's Inferno.
238. ld.
239. /d. at 81.
210. /d. at 81.
241. ld. at 8G.
242. See, e.g, .John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations:
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 88AM. J. Soc. 310 (1977).
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institutional myths." 243 Educational authorities use general
societal anxiety about out-of-control students and drug use, for
example, to justify the adoption of new forms of social control
in schools, such as disciplinary alternative education, zerotolerance policies, highly-restrictive dress codes, and, of course,
drug testing programs. In turn, the accoutrements associated
with school expand to include separate alternative campuses,
school resource officers, deans of students, and drug testing
personnel and practices. These modifications in school's formal
structure and mission "demonstrate that it is acting on
collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner,"
legitimizing both school and its new "institutionalized
elements." 244 School authorities are thus incentivized to adopt
emerging institutional responses as they are legitimized and to
continually search for new areas of potential mission
expanswn, especially as society becomes increasingly
conditioned to expect a school-based response to social
problems. 245 As a result, the rapid increase in student drug
testing programs can be attributed at least in part to school
authorities adopting programs out of a sense of obligationdrug testing has become something that Real Schools do. 246
This would help explain the spread of drug testing in Vernonia
and Earls; what started as testing in a district with serious
drug problems eventually came to be a fixture in a district with
almost no problem.
The Supreme Court contributes to this augmentation of the
common script by supplying "official legitimacy based on legal
mandates." 247 This is because highly rational-legal societies

243. !d. at ::344-45 ("i\.s rationalizing institutional myths arise in existing domains
of activity, extant organizations expand their formal structures so as to become
isomorphic with these new myths.").
244. /d. at 319; see also id. at ::318 ("School administrators who create new curricula
or training programs attempt to validate them as legitimate innovations in educational
theory and government requirements. If they are successful, the new procedures can be
perpetuated as authoritatively required or at least satisfactory.").
245. !d. at 350 ("Failure to incorporate the proper elements of structure is
negligent and irrational; the continued flow of support is threatened and internal
dissidents are strengthened. i\.t the same time, these myths present organizations with
great opportunities for expansion.").
246. The creation of the Student Drug Testing Institute within the fedl,ral
Department of Education seems to confirm this. SDTl provides federal grants to school
districts to help cover the cost of implementing drug testing regimes. See STUDENT
DRUG TESTING INSTITUTE, http://sdti.ed.gov/ (last visited ,Jan. 28, 2010).
247. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 212, at :H7.
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like the United States "are especially prone to give collective
(legal) authority to institutions," like the Court, "which
legitimate particular organizational structures."248 This is
closely analogous to popular understanding of the Court as "the
authoritative
constitutional
interpreter,"249
whose
pronouncements regarding constitutionality effectively serve a
legitimizing/delegitimizing function. When the Court upholds a
challenged program related to educationalization, then, the
Court bestows on school-implemented mechanisms the final bit
of legitimacy necessary to modify the common script.
This does not mean that only Court-legitimated programs
get added to the script, but it does suggest that Court approval
becomes a precondition once a mechanism has been challenged.
It is perhaps easier to think of this in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions. To use student drug testing as an
example: it is possible that student drug testing could have
become a part of the common script without Vernonia or Earls.
Once the issue reached the Court, however, its approval
became necessary; a contrary holding in either case would have
either declared student drug testing as illegitimate or cabined
such programs to narrow circumstances. In the context of
student speech and school search cases, however, the Court's
highly-deferential stance towards the decisions of school
authorities arguably has turned over final responsibility for
legitimating challenged organizational structures to actors at
the school level.
C. Inequality of Political Socialization: A Patchwork
Federalism of Student Autonomy Experiences

As the preceding discussion has argued, school officials
have broad discretion to choose between the competing visions
of the Government as Educator, which are then implemented
through policies falling at various points along the continuum
between teacher-centeredness and student-centeredness.
School officials, however, make these decisions based on their
conceptions of what constitutes acceptable degrees of student
autonomy-decisions that are thus likely to vary from place to
place. Consequently, students encounter varied treatment of

/d.
249. Tom Donnelly, Note, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the
Stories We Tell Our Children, 118 YALE L. ,J. 948, 953 (2009).
218.
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their autonomy interests at the hands of the Government as
Educator when it comes to student speech and school search
rights.
Although at first glance this might appear to be no more
than a restatement of the commonly accepted conception of
education as an inherently local concern, the Court has
continually asserted that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." 250 And, constitutional rights are not
normally things that vary from place to place without
exceptional justification; despite their differences, the Bill of
Rights applies with equal vigor to a citizen in San Francisco as
it does a citizen in rural Mississippi. The Court's student
speech and school search caselaw nonetheless has created a
background framework that provides a patina of legitimacy to
local school officials' varied treatment of student autonomy, a
construct that would implicate equal protection and due
process concerns were it applied to adult citizens. 251 Yet, if
"[t]he schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to
experience the power of government" and "the values they
learn there, they take with them in life," 252 one might ponder
the political socialization-related consequences of a system that
allows government entities to treat citizens-albeit students-

250. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :l9::J U.S. 50:3, 507-08 (1969).
251. This very concern serves as partial justification of the Court's "special needs"
doctrine in general. But, it is worth noting here at least one incongruous feature of
schools within the special needs doctrine: in the school context, the ostensibly regulated
parties have great discretion in fleshing out the ends and means justified and
permitted by the special needs inherent in the regulated environment. Thus, the same
special needs that underlay the Tinher Court's substantial disruption standard evolvPd
to support the more expansive and malleable potential standards based on student
welfare and physical safety advanced in Morse. So, too, the expansion of student drug
testing from the drug-use laden context of Vernonia, which arguably presented
evidence of special need, to J<Jarls, in which school authorities seemingly strained to
find evidence of a special-needs-justifying drug problem. Other special needs contexts,
by contrast, are more limited in discretion, scope, and application or at least concern
issues of greater import than participation in a high school's marching hand. See, e.g,
Nat'! Treas. Employees Union v. Von Raab, 189 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (upholding "the
suspicionless testing of [customs] employees who apply for promotion to positions
directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to positions that require the
incumbent to carry a firearm"); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 189 U.S. 602,
628 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of railway personnel who "discharge
duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of
attention can have disastrous consequences").
252. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 825, 885-86 (1985) (Stevens, .J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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in profoundly different ways depending on where those
students happen to go to school. 25 3
To briefly speculate on this inequality of political
socialization, consider the experience of an average student in
one of two hypothetical school districts, each representing
either a stridently student-centered or teacher-centered vision
of the Government as Educator. The student-centered district
adheres closely to Tinker's substantial-disruption standard,
exercises little or no editorial control over extracurricular
activities, 254 refuses to subject students to drug tests,2 55 allows
students broad expressive rights including a non-restrictive
dress code, and generally conducts searches of students only
with individualized suspicion and probable cause. 256 On the
other hand, the teacher-centered district opts for Fraser's

253. Schools varied treatment of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender students'
and their associative and expressive interests provides instructive examples. Compare
Jill Tucker, S.F. School Board OKs New Gay Support Program, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 10,
2010 (reporting on the San Francisco Unified School Board's decision to earmark
$120,000 annually "to fund a substantial increase in instruction and services related to
gay and lesbian issues") with Editorial, Right of Passage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, at
A24 (opining on a Mississippi school district's prohibiting Constance McMillen, a
lesbian high school senior, from attending prom with her girlfriend); see also Adam
Lynch, School Cuts Gay Student Photo From Yearbook, JACKSON FREE PRESS, Apr. 26,
2010, (reporting that a school refused to include a lesbian student's picture in its
yearbook based on her decision to wear a tuxedo for her senior portrait). Harvey Milk
High School in New York City, "the nation's first public school for gay and lesbian
youth," probably stands as one of the most prominent-and controversial--examples of
schools supporting students' autonomy- and expression-related interests. John
Colapinto, The Harvey Milk School Has No Right to Exist. Discuss, NEW YORK MAG.,
May 21, 2005, available at: http://nymag.com/nymetro/newslfeatures/10970/.
254. In some cases state "anti-Hazelwood" statutes affirmatively provide for
protection of students' speech- and press-related rights. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §
48907 (providing that public school students' free speech rights "includ[e], hut [are] not
limited to. the use of bulletin boards, the distribution of printed materials or petitions,
the wearing of buttons, badges, and other insignia," and protect "the right of expression
in official publications, whether or not the publications or other means of expression
are supported financially by the school or by use of school facilities .... "). Uniquely,
California's "Leonard Law" statutorily protects student speech rights both on- and offcampus and applies even to private schools. CAL. EIJUC. CODE § 48950 (prohibiting the
"mak[ing] or enforce[ment of] any rule subjecting any high school pupil to disciplinary
sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is speech or other communication that,
when engaged in outside of the campus, is protected from governmental restriction"
under the federal or California constitutions.
255. Although not ruled out by a "student-centered" district policy, the Washington
State Supreme Court struck down suspicionless student drug testing based on its
interpretation of the Washington State Constitution. See York v. Wahkiakum Sch. /Jist.
No. 200, 163 Wash. 2d 297, 178 P.3d 995 (2008) (citing WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7).
256. See id.
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educational-mission standard, 257 pervasively regulates and
censors extracurricular activities, engages in widespread drug
testing, imposes a highly-restrictive dress code or uniform
policy, and frequently subjects students to searches under an
aggressive interpretation of T.L.O.'s reasonableness standard,
perhaps even reserving the right to use "strip searches" under
Safford's safe harbor.
The Court's teacher-centered conception of the Government
as Educator allows the existence of both kinds of school
districts, and undoubtedly both types of districts can be found
across the United States. It does not involve too much
speculation to hypothesize that the students undergoing such
radically different experiences grow up to hold different
conceptions about what constitutes appropriate government
authority, contributing to Americans' increasing ideological
fractionalization.
Additionally,
from
an
education-forcitizenship viewpoint, inequality of political socialization risks
privileging those students who are allowed greater autonomy
to practice citizenship in school vis-a-vis those students
encountering more circumscribed autonomy experiences. 25 x If
public schools promote equality of opportunity rather than
equality of outcome, then students' public school experience
should provide an equal opportunity to develop and practice
citizenship. 259
In short, students are likely to be politically socialized to
believe in different degrees of acceptable government authority.
Students in a highly student-centered district are likely to be
politically socialized to a less authoritarian view of government
in which the government's proper role is one that allows or
fosters a wide range of expression, permits values-pluralism,
and respects expansive conceptions of individual privacy.
Under a highly teacher-centered experience, students may be
politically socialized to believe that government should act in a
more authoritarian capacity, actively regulating or suppressing

257. See the dismssion of Morse in supra Part ll.C.l.
258. This assumes that K-12 schools, in addition to inculcating values, can play a
decisive role in the development of effective citizenship-related skills. But see Curtis G.
Dailey, Student Speech in Public Schools: A Comprehensive Analytical Frameworh
Based on the Role of Public Schools in Democratic Education, 2009 B.Y.U. EllUC. & L.
J. 1, 29-34 (2009) (arguing that K-12 public schools are primarily about values
inculcation and universities are for "democratic skill development").
259. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, J~ducation, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116
YALE L .•J. 3:30, 3:35 (2006).
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certain forms of expression, engaging in values-promotion and
values-imposition, and constricting the sphere of permissible
individual privacy. These are all key components of political
and ideological identity.
The general acceptance of inequality in political
socialization in public schools stands in contrast to intolerance
of inequality in other areas,2 60 such as student achievement, 261
teacher quality, 262 or per-pupil spending. 263 Whether this
results from education's general susceptibility to arguments
grounded in "local control" 264 or because of assumptions that
the Government as Educator must, "unlike government in its
role of government-as-sovereign[,] . . . regularly decide some
expressions are superior to others," 265 the consequences of such
inequality are worth exploring. Although an expansive analysis
of social attitudes is beyond the scope of this Article, further
research should be conducted into the relationship between
students' political socialization experiences and later political
and ideological beliefs. This line of research will become even
more salient as the federal government increases its role in K12 education, exemplified by No Child Left Behind, the Obama
Administration's "Race to the Top" program, and efforts to
develop national content area standards, because expanding

260. See, e.g, JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAm; INEQUALITIES (1991).
261. See, e.g, THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith
Phillips, cds., 1998).
262. See, e.g., The Civil Hights Project at Harvard University, Gail L. Sunderman
& Jimmy Kim, Teacher Quality: Equalizing Educational Outcomes and Opportunities
(2005), available at: http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu; see also Renee v.
Duncan, 5n F.~3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (concerning the highly-qualified teacher
provisions of No Child Left Behind) (pending en bane review); Jason Felch, Jason Song
& Doug Smith, Grading the Teachers: Who's Teaching L.A.'s Kids?, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
15, 2010, at A 1 (value-added analysis of teacher effectiveness in the Los Angeles
Unified School District).
263. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 111 U.S. 1 (1973); see
also John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: The Third Wave Recedes, in FROM
SCHOOLHOUS~; TO COURTHOUSE 9() (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West, eds., 2009);
William S. Koski & Jesse Hahne!, The Past, Present, and Possible Futures of Education
Finance Reform Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH TN EDUCATION FINANCE AND
POLICY 12 (Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske, eds., 2008).
261. See, e.g., Denis P. Doyle & Chester Finn, Jr., American Schools and the
Future of Local Control, 77 NAT'L AFFAIRS 77, 77 (.June 1981) ("No term in the lexicon of
American education is more revered than "local control.").
2()5. Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 Ge;o. L .•J. 945, 993-94
(2009) ("[d]istinguishing Government as Educator from Government as Sovereign" as a
means to preserve academic freedom in the context of higher education).
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federal authority inevitably will challenge the assumptions
behind and content of traditionally localist conceptions of
education, 266 including values-transmission.

IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that in the context of its student
speech and school search caselaw, the Supreme Court has
adopted a "teacher-centered" conception of the Government as
Educator that greatly enhances the authority of school
authorities to inculcate values. This vision of the Government
as Educator responds to and limits a more student-centered
possibility in which students would have a greater opportunity
to practice citizenship. As a result of its strong deference to
school authorities in the student speech and school search
contexts, the Court has failed to exercise a potential check on
the educationalization of social problems and, in turn, the
expansion of the "Real Schools" construct to include
ed uca tionaliza tion- related mechanisms.
Furthermore, the Court's teacher-centered approach has
profound implications for the political socialization of students.
If "the stories we tell our schoolchildren matter" and "set the
terms of our constitutional culture," 267 what lessons do
students learn from their experience in school environments
that condition participation in the mock trial team on
volunteering a urine sample? If "participation in [the common
script] is ... a ritual that affirms membership in mainstream
American life," 268 what does it mean for adult citizenship that
the script limits student expression to certain values acceptable
to school administrators, who often are ready to use nebulous

266. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 259, at :399-406 (2006) (making an argument under
the Fourteenth Amendment that "does not assign constitutional weight to the daim
that education is an area of 'traditional state concern"' because "[njot only has the
factual basis for this claim been eroded by recent policy developments culminating in
NCLB, but the normative element of the claim stands in tension with thl'
constitutional investiture of authority and responsibility in Congress to secure the
essential conditions of opportunity for meaningful national citizenship."); Matt Miller,
First, Kill All the School Boards: A Modest Proposal to Fix the Schools, THE ATLANTIC
92 (Jan./Feb. 2008).
267. Donnelly, supra note 249, at 999.
268. Met;-:, supra note 21, at 87.
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and expansive standards based on inevitably varied and
potentially inconsistent conceptions of student welfare?
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